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This paper reports the ﬁrst laboratory study of the swing voter’s curse and provides insights
on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on "pivotal voter" models. Our experiment
controls for diﬀerent information levels of voters, as well as the size of the electorate, the distri-
bution of preferences, and other theoretically relevant parameters. The design varies the share
of partisan voters and the prior belief about a payoﬀ relevant state of the world. Our results
support the equilibrium predictions of the Feddersen-Pesendorfer model. The voters act as if
they are aware of the swing voter’s curse and adjust their behavior to compensate. While the
compensation is not complete and there is some heterogeneity in individual behavior, we ﬁnd
that aggregate outcomes, such as eﬃciency, turnout, and margin of victory, closely track the
theoretical predictions.Voter turnout has traditionally proven diﬃcult to explain. Rational models highlight the
fact that the incentives to participate in an election depend on the probability of being pivotal.
If voting is costly, then signiﬁcant turnout in large elections is inconsistent with equilibrium
behavior (see Ledyard [1984] and Palfrey and Rosenthal [1983, 1985]). If voting is costless, then
abstention is a dominated choice. However, this is also inconsistent with observed behavior.
Voters often selectively abstain in the same election—Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1996] report
that almost 1 million voters participated in the 1994 Illinois gubernatorial contest but abstained
on the state constitutional amendment listed on the same ballot, even though the amendment
was listed ﬁrst. Crain, et al. [1987] report that in the 1982 midterm elections turnout levels
averaged 3% higher for the Senate contests in those states with such contests than the House
races that were on the same ballot. In seven of the 219 races they studied, the diﬀerence in
turnout was larger than the margin of victory in the House race, suggesting that voters were
abstaining even in close contests.1 Assuming that voting is virtually costless when already in
the ballot booth, this seems irrational.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1996] show that these large abstention rates can be explained
even if the cost of voting is zero if there is asymmetric information, thereby rationalizing such
behavior. They draw an analogy between the voters’ problem and the “winner’s curse” observed
among bidders in an auction (see Kagel and Levin [2005] and Thaler [1996]).2 Ap o o r l y
informed voter may be better oﬀ in equilibrium to leave the decision to informed voters because
his uninformed vote may go against their choice and could decide the outcome in the wrong
direction. The voter, therefore, may rationally “delegate” the decision to more informed voters
1They omitted states with gubernatorial contests to focus on the choice whether to vote in both the Senate
and House races. Wattenberg, et al. [2000] report that in the 1994 California election 8% of those who voted for
governor abstained in state legislative elections and over 35% abstained on state supreme court judicial retention
votes. They note that the pattern of abstention appears independent of ballot order, with the abstention of those
who voted in the governors’ race only 2% on two ballot propositions which were seven ballot positions below the
judicial retention elections.
2By this term, economists refer to the phenomenon in which bidders in a common value auction overbid with
respect to what would be optimal in equilibrium. This occurs because they do not realize that, conditional on
winning, the expected value of the object is lower than ex ante. A bidder wins precisely when his or her estimated
value of the object for sale is inﬂated relative to other bidders’ estimates, and hence relative to actual value.
1by abstaining even if voting is costless. Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1996] name this phenomenon
the swing voter’s curse.
This theory explains some empirical facts, but it remains—along with rational theories of vot-
ing more generally—highly controversial (see Feddersen [2004] for a recent discussion). Empirical
evidence has been produced both in favor and against rational voter theories, especially when
compared to the assumption that voters act naively and ignore strategic considerations.3 None
of these results, however, are conclusive, partly because ﬁeld data sets are not rich enough to
identify all the variables that may aﬀect voters’ decisions. This is especially true for tests of
rational theories of voting based on asymmetric information, such as the swing voter’s curse.
To overcome the problems with ﬁeld data, in this paper reports the ﬁrst laboratory study of
the swing voter’s curse. The laboratory setting allows us to control and directly observe the level
of information of diﬀerent voters, as well as preferences, voting costs, and other theoretically
relevant parameters. We ﬁnd strong support for the theory. In a common value environment
where all voters have the same preferences but are asymmetrically informed, poorly informed
voters always strategically abstain when both outcomes are equally likely, delegating their votes
to more informed voters. When a partisan bias is introduced -i.e., some voters’ preferences favor
a given candidate independently from private information- uninformed voters vote strategically
to balance out the partisans’ votes, thus increasing the probability of voting as partisan bias
increases. The main comparative static predictions of the model are tested: as key parameters
of the environment change, the fraction of voters who vote against the partisan bias tracks very
closely the equilibrium predictions. Even when the partisan-favored outcome is the more ex ante
likely outcome, we ﬁnd most voters balancing in this way by voting against their prior beliefs.
These results are supported at both the aggregate and individual level and across sessions and
treatment conﬁgurations.
3Feddersen [2004] reviews this literature. Matsusaka and Palda [1999], based on an extensive study of turnout
decisions using both survey and aggregate data, contend that strategic theories of voter turnout provide little
explanatory power in explaining voter choices and that turnout decisions appear to be random. Coate, et al.
[2006] propose a simple model of expressive voting, and argue that it explains turnout in local Texas referenda
better than the standard pivotal voting model.
2Our results, however, provide insights on the larger “pivotal-voter” literature.4 Among
other things, we ﬁnd that turnout and margin of victory both increase with the number of
informed voters and that there is a positive relationship between these two variables, contrary
to the common view that rational models of turnout should predict that closeness and turnout
are positively related. These results suggest that tests using ﬁeld data of whether turnout is
related to closeness, which are unable to control for information asymmetries, are inadequate or
at best very weak tests of rational voting models.
Although there is a growing literature testing predictions of voting models, our attempt to
test the pivotal voting model of turnout and behavior using laboratory experiments is signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from previous experiments which have primarily focused on cases where infor-
mation is symmetric and voting is costly.5 Much less experimental work has been done with
models with asymmetric information. Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey [2000] test Fedder-
sen and Pesendorfer Jury’s model (Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1998]) and focus on information
aggregation in small committees. They rule out abstention by assumption, and therefore do
not provide evidence on participation. Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey [2007] study sequential
voting in a similar model but allow abstention. However, all voters are equally well informed.
As i g n i ﬁcant non-experimental empirical literature on turnout exists and a number of these
studies attempt to test the pivotal voter model on large elections or a variant of the model
as augmented by group and/or ethical motivations for voting (see, for example, Hansen, et al.
[1987], Filer, et al. [1993], Shachar and Nalebuﬀ [1999], Coate and Conlin [2004], Noury [2004],
4This literature includes the earlier models with symmetric information and costly voting (Ledyard [1984],
Palfrey and Rosenthal [1983]); asymmetric information and costly voting Palfrey and Rosenthal [1985]); and the
broader theoretical literature that focuses on information aggregation in elections with common or private values
and asymmetric information (Austen-Smith and Banks [1996], Battaglini [2005], Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1997,
1999] and others).
5See Schram and Sonnemans [1996], Cason and Mui [2005], Grosser, et al. [2005] who have studied strate-
gic voters participation in laboratory experiments, focusing on environments with symmetric information and
homogeneous costs. One problem with these early works is that, under these assumptions, voting models may
have many equilibria. Levine and Palfrey [2007] have recently conducted expeirments based on a model with
heterogeneous costs which has a unique equilibrium. They ﬁnd support for the three primary predictions of
the rational model: (1) turnout declines with the size of the electorate (the size eﬀect); (2) turnout is higher in
elections that are expected to be close (the competition eﬀect); and (3) turnout is higher for voters who prefer
the less popular alternative (the underdog eﬀect).
3and Coate, et al. [2006]). None of these studies are able to evaluate the role of asymmetric
information in explaining abstention and test the swing voter’s curse.
A number of researchers have used variations in voter information in ﬁeld studies to evaluate
the eﬀect of information on the choice to abstain which suggest support for the swing voter’s curse
(see, for example, Palfrey and Poole [1987], Wattenberg, et al. [2000], and Coupe and Noury
[2004]). The main ﬁnding is that turnout is positively correlated with voter information levels,
but this work cannot identify the causal relationship since the demand for political information
may be derived from the decision to participate. Recently researchers have examined the
impact on turnout of changes in political information where political information is arguably
an exogenous variable. McDermott [2005] and Klein and Baum [2001] present evidence that
respondents to surveys during elections are more likely to state preferences when information is
provided to them. Gentzkow [2005] shows that decreases in voter information associated with the
advent to television in U.S. counties is correlated with decreasing voter turnout. Lassen [2005]
examined turnout in a Copenhagen election where residents of four of the city’s ﬁfteen districts
were provided with detailed information about the choices in an upcoming referendum. He ﬁnds
that voters provided with more information were more likely to participate. Lassen concedes
that there are alternative possible explanations for the relationship between information and
turnout, and ﬁeld data may not be accurate enough to identify the correct theory: “The natural
experiment used here does not allow for distinguishing between the decision-theoretic and game-
theoretic approaches ....; this may call for careful laboratory experiments, as the predictions of
the models diﬀer in only subtle ways that can be diﬃcult to accommodate in even random social
experiments..” (p. 116). Our controlled laboratory experiment precisely allows us to put under
scrutiny these subtle diﬀerences between the swing voter’s curse and other alternative theories.
4IT H E M O D E L
We consider a game with a set of N voters who deliberate by majority rule. There are two
alternatives A, B and two states of the world: in the ﬁrst state A is optimal and in the second
state B is optimal. Without loss of generality, we label A the ﬁrst state and B the second. A
number n ≤ N of the voters are independent voters. These voters have identical preferences
represented by a utility function u(x,θ) that is a function of the state of the world θ ∈ {A,B}
and the action x ∈ {A,B}:
u(A,A)=u(B,B)=1
u(A,B)=u(B,A)=0
State A has a prior probability π ≥ 1
2. The true state of the world is unknown, but each voter
may receive an informative signal. We assume that signals of diﬀerent agents are conditionally
independent. The signal can take three values a,b, and ∅ with probabilities:
Pr(a|A)=P r ( b|B)=p and Pr(∅|A)=P r ( ∅|B)=1− p
The agent, therefore, is perfectly informed on the state of the world with probability p (i.e.,
observes a or b) and has no information with probability 1−p (i.e., observes ∅). The remaining
m = N −n voters are partisan voters. We assume that the partisans strictly prefer policy A in
all states. For convenience we assume that m is even, n is odd and m ≤ n − 3.6
After swing voters have seen their private signal, all voters vote or abstain simultaneously.
Each voter can vote for A, vote for B, or abstain. The policy choice with the majority of
votes cast wins and ties are broken randomly. In any equilibrium, the independent voters who
receive an informative signal always strictly prefer the state that matches their signal; and the
partisans always strictly prefer state A: in any equilibrium, therefore independents would always
vote for the state suggested by their signal, and partisans would always vote for A.W e c a n
6These assumptions are made only to simplify the notation. In Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1996] m is random
variable; however, since they focus the analysis on the limit case in which n →∞ , the realized fraction of partisan
voters is constant by the Law of Large Numbers in their model.
5therefore focus on the behavior of the uninformed agents. Let σi
A,σ i
B, and σi
φ be respectively
the probability that an uninformed agents votes for A, B and abstains. An equilibrium of this
game is symmetric if agents with the same signal use the same strategy: σi = σ for all i.W e
analyze symmetric equilibria in which agents do not use weakly dominated strategies and we
will refer to them simply as equilibria.
II THE VOTING EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we characterize the equilibria of the voting game, and the equilibrium is unique
for the experimental parameters. Contrary to Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1996] and other
previous results in the literature, we do not limit the analysis to asymptotic results that hold
as the size of the electorate grows to inﬁnity, but focus on results that hold even for a ﬁnite
number of voters. This allows us to test the model directly with an electorate of a size that can
be managed in a laboratory. Formal proofs of all the results appear in an Appendix.
II.1 No Partisan Bias
We ﬁrst consider the benchmark case in which all the voters have the same common value, so
m =0 .
Lemma 1 Let m =0 .I fπ = 1
2,t h e nσA = σB; if π>1
2,t h e nσA ≥ σB.
The intuition of this result is as follows. If the uniformed voters are voting for, say B,w i t h
higher probability, then if pivotal it is more likely that alternative A has attracted more votes
from informed voters. If this is the case, then conditioning on the pivotal event, alternative
A is more attractive to an uninformed independent, and none of them would vote for B,a
contradiction.
Though this result provides testable predictions, it can be made more precise:
Proposition 1 Let m =0 .I fπ = 1
2,t h e nσA = σB =0 ;i fπ>1
2,t h e nσA ≥ σB =0 .
6This is a particular form of the Swing Voters’ Curse. To see the intuition behind it, suppose
the prior is π = 1
2. If an uninformed voter were to choose in isolation, he would be indiﬀerent
between the two options A or B. When voting in a group, however, he knows that with positive
probability some other voter is informed. By voting, he risks voting against this more informed
voter. So, since he has the same preferences of this informed voter and he is otherwise indiﬀerent
among the alternatives because he has no private information on the state, he always ﬁnds it
optimal to abstain. When the prior is π>1
2, the problem of the voter is more complicated.
In this case the swing voter’s curse is mitigated by the fact that the prior favors one of the two
alternatives. As before, the voter does not want to vote against an informed voter. However,
he is not sure that there is an informed voter: and if no informed voter is voting, he strictly
prefers alternative A since this is ex ante more likely. Thus although the voter never ﬁnds it
optimal to vote for B,h em a yﬁnd it optimal to vote for A. The higher is π, the higher is the
incentive to vote for A; the higher is p (i.e. the probability that there are other informed voters),
the lower is the incentive to vote. For any p,i fπ>1
2 is not too high, the voter abstains.
From Proposition 1 we know that when π ≥ 1
2 a voter would never vote for B if m =0 ,
so σB =0 . Given this, the expected utility of an uninformed voter from voting for A,a n d
therefore σA, can be easily computed. Let uA and uφ be respectively the expected utilities of
voting for A and abstaining for an uniformed voter, expressed as functions of the probabilities
of pivotal events, which in turn depend on σ.L e tP0 denote the event when there is a tie among
the other voters between A and B;a n dl e tPA denote the event in which policy A is losing to B
b yo n ev o t e .T h ed i ﬀerence between the expected utility of voting for A and the expected utility
of abstaining is:
uA − uφ =
1
2
[π Pr(P0 |A) − (1 − π)Pr(P0 |B)] (1)
+
1
2
[πPr(PA |A) − (1 − π)Pr(PA |B)]
7where
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since in this case Pr(PA |A)=0(in state A no voter ever votes for B). If uninformed voters
mix between voting for A and abstaning in equilibrium, then the equation that gives us σA is:
uA−uφ =0 . From Proposition 1 we know that σA =0when π = 1
2, so we only need to compute
the equation for the case in which π>1
2. E q u a t i o n( 1 )c a nb ee a s i l yc o m p u t e df o rs p e c i ﬁc
parameters. In the following analysis we chose parameters such that σA = σB =0when m =0
even when π>1
2.
II.2 Partisan Bias
Let us now consider an environment in which A has a partisan advantage: m>0 Assume ﬁrst
that π = 1
2. In this case the swing voter’s curse is confounded by the bias introduced by the
partisans. Conditioning on the event in which the two alternatives receive the same number of
votes, the voter realizes that it is more likely that B has received some votes from informative
voters because he knows for sure that some of the votes cast in favor of A, coming from partisans,
are uninformative. Indeed, the voter may be willing to vote for B, because doing so oﬀsets a
partisan vote. As in the previous case with m =0 , the voters’ problem is more complicated
when π>1
2. In this case the prior probability favors A, so the incentives to vote for B are
8weaker, and a voter will ﬁn di to p t i m a lt od os oo n l yi ft h e r eare enough informed voters in the
population. This is summarized in the following result:
Lemma 2 Let m>0.I f π = 1
2,then σA ≤ σB;i fπ>1
2, then there is a p such that p>p
implies σA ≤ σB.
In this case too this result can be made more precise by showing that no voter would ever
vote for A:
Proposition 2 Let m>0.I fπ = 1
2,o ri fπ>1
2 and p is large enough, then σB >σ A =0 .
The probability with which the uninformed voters vote for B depends on the parameters
of the model, m, p, n, π. For example, the higher is the bias in favor of A, the higher is the
incentive for uninformed voters to oﬀset it by voting for B. The exact probability σB can
be easily computed for speciﬁc parameter values when m>0.7 From Proposition 1 we know
that we only have one variable to determine, σB; and one equation to respect: in a mixed
strategy equilibrium the agent must be indiﬀerent between abstaining and voting for B.T h i s
indiﬀerence condition requires that the net expected utility of voting to be zero. We can write
the equilibrium condition as:
uB − uφ =
1
2
[(1 − π)Pr(P0 |B) − πPr(P0 |A)] +
1
2
[(1 − π)Pr(PB |B) − πPr(PB |A)] = 0
where uB is the expected utility of voting for B for an uninformed voter; (1 − π)Pr(P0 |B) −
πPr(P0 |A) is equal to:
(1 − π)
µ
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¶
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7The case with m =0is not necessary since from Proposition 1 we know that the uninformed voters never
vote for B.
9and (1 − π)Pr(PB |B) − πPr(PB |A) is equal to:
(1 − π)
µ
(n − 1)!
(n − m)!(m − 1)!
¶
((1 − p)(1− σB))
n−m (p +( 1− p)σB)
m−1
−π
n−3−m
2 X
j=0
⎛
⎝ (n − 1)!
³
n−(2j+1)−m
2
´
!
³
n−2−(2j+1)+m
2
´
!(2j +1 ) !
⎞
⎠
·((1 − p)(1− σB))
(2j+1) p
n−(2j+1)−m
2 ((1 − p)σB)
n−2−(2j+1)+m
2 .
Consider the expected utility of voting for B for an uninformed voter when p = 1
4, n =7 ,
π =0 .5,m=2 . We have a unique symmetric equilibrium since the expected utility of voting
for B equals zero only once in the [0,1] interval. When m =2 , the equilibrium strategy is
σB =0 .36. Correspondingly, when m =4 ,w eh a v eσB =0 .76.8
In a similar way we can ﬁnd the equilibrium in the case in which π>0.5.W e h a v e e x p l i c i t l y
computed the equilibrium when π = 5
9, and the other parameters are as above. In this case
too we have a unique equilibrium in correspondence of which with m =2 , σB =0 .33,a n dw i t h
m =4 , σB =0 .73. Hence, a small increase in π has a small eﬀect on the equilibrium strategies
and tends to reduce the probability of voting for B.
II.3 Alternative benchmarks
To evaluate the performance of the Swing Voters’ Curse theory, it is useful to test its predictions
about voter behavior as a function of π and m against alternative models of turnout. A natural
benchmark is the non-strategic decision theoretic model (e.g., Matsusaka’s [1995]). This is the
model chosen by Fedderesen and Pesendorfer [1996] and the leading alternative explanation of
the phenomena motivating their theory. The decision theoretic model assumes that agents are
not strategic and do not form expectations conditioning on being pivotal, but choose actions
rationally on the basis of their available information, as in a "decision theoretic" environment, as
if there were no other voters. In Matsusaka’s model, therefore, we would not expect uninformed
voters to vote for B more often when there is a partisan bias as compared to no bias. If voters
8Unless otherwise noted in the paper, we round oﬀ to two decimal places.
10vote on the basis of their prior, the change in π from .5 to .55 should induce them to vote for
A, regardless of the partisan bias. This is also consistent with models of expressive voting used
as a benchmark in Coate, et al. [2006].
The decision theoretic model is appealing because it is simple and intuitive: it postulates that
voters vote sincerely, that is according to their individual preferences (as determined by their
information), without consideration of how other voters may be voting, and therefore requires no
strategic sophistication on the part of the voters. This makes it a polar opposite to the Bayesian
Nash equilbirium model proposed by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998). Although the political
science literature has not articulated many other models of behavior to explain the swing voter’s
curse phenonenon, recent work in game theory provides a range of intermediate theories between
these extremes: models of partially bounded rationality that modulate the players’ strategic
sophistication from the extreme of complete naivete to fully rational equilibrium behavior. In
Section IV.2, we focus on four approaches that have received particular attention in recent
work: the Level k theories, the Analogy-Based Expectations and Cursed Equilibria, and ﬁnally
the Quantal Response Equilibrium. That section describes in detail the predictions of these
models and compares them with the data and the predictions of the swing voter’s curse model.
III EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We use controlled laboratory experiments to evaluate the theoretical predictions. Once a speciﬁc
parametrization for n, m,a n dp is chosen, the model described and solved in the previous section
can be directly tested in the lab without changes. All the laboratory experiments used n =7
and p =0 .25.W e u s e d t w o d i ﬀerent treatments for the state of the world: π =1 /2 and π =5 /9
and three diﬀerent treatments for partisan bias: m =0 ,2, and 4. Table 1 summarizes the
equilibrium strategies for each treatment as derived in the previous section.
In the last row of Table 1 we contrast our theoretical predictions with a simple decision
theoretic model with sincere (non strategic voting) similar to Matsusaka [1995]. Matsusaka as-
11sumes that voters participate for consumption beneﬁts that are independent of whether they are
pivotal, they vote sincerely for the option they most prefer regardless of strategic considerations.
These consumption beneﬁts then are positively related to voters’ certainty over which choices
yield them the highest utility which depends on their information about the choices, but not
about the strategic consequences of their choices. When voters’ are uninformed and therefore
perceive all options as equally good, a sincere voting, decision-theoretic model predicts that they
will abstain, but that more precise information about the value of an option to the individual
increases the probability that they will vote. Thus, in our experimental design, uninformed
sincere, decision-theoretic voters should abstain when π =0 .5, regardless of the size of the par-
tisan bias since they do not care about pivotality and they believe all options are equally good.
When π =5 /9, uninformed sincere, decision-theoretic voters should have a positive probability
of voting for a since their belief is that a has a higher probability than b of yielding them a
higher utility and a zero probability of voting for b, regardless of the size of the partisan bias
(since they do not vote strategically based on whether their votes are pivotal).
Table 1: Equilibrium Strategies for Uninformed Voters
Probability of State a
Partisan Bias π =1 /2 π =5 /9
m =0 σB = σA =0 σA = σB =0
m =2 σB =0 .36 >σ A =0 σB =0 .33 >σ A =0
m =4 σB =0 .76 >σ A =0 σB =0 .73 >σ A =0
Decision-Theoretic, Sincere Voters σB = σA =0 σA >σ B =0
We acknowledge, however, that most research that assumes sincere, decision-theoretic voting
implicitly also assumes that voters have little information about the strategic consequences of
their votes such as the precise number of partisans in the electorate and that sincere, decision-
theoretic voting is a consequence of that lack of information rather than a response in the face
of information on strategic consequences of a vote. Thus, our analysis cannot reject sincere,
decision-theoretic voting due to a lack of information on strategic consequences in the electorate
at large and can only speak to the predictive power of the decision-theoretic model when such
information is available to voters.
12The experiments were all conducted at the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social
Science and used registered students from Princeton University. Each experiment was divided
into three parts, each of which lasted for 10 periods. All three parts used the same value of
π, but used diﬀerent values of m =0 ,2, and 4. We varied the sequence of m in the diﬀerent
parts in order to provide some control for learning eﬀects, using a within subjects design. Five
diﬀerent sequences were conducted. Each subject participated in exactly one sequence.
The experiment was conducted in seven sessions. In ﬁve sessions 14 subjects participated;
in two sessions 7 subjects participated for a total of 84 distinct subjects.9 In sessions with 14
participants, subjects were randomly divided into groups of seven for each period. In sessions
with 7 participants, subjects comprised a single voting group for all periods. Table 2 summarizes
the sequences and values of π by session.
Table 2: Sequences and π by Session
Session Sequence π Number
1 m =( 2 ,4,0) 1/2 14
2 m =( 4 ,2,0) 1/2 14
3 m =( 0 ,4,2) 5/9 14
4 m =( 0 ,2,4) 5/9 14
5 m =( 4 ,0,2) 5/9 14
6 m =( 4 ,2,0) 5/9 7
7 m =( 4 ,2,0) 5/9 7
Instructions were read aloud and subjects were required to correctly answer all questions on
a short comprehension quiz before the experiment was conducted. Subjects were also provided
a summary sheet about the rules of the experiment which they could consult. A copy of the ex-
perimental instructions is available online at http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~trp/svc-instruction-
appendix.pdf. The experiments were conducted via computers.10 Subjects were told there were
two possible jars, Jar 1 and Jar 2. Jar 1 contained six white balls and two red; jar 2 contained
six white balls and two yellow. The monitor from the experiment randomly chose a jar for each
group in each period by tossing a fair die according to the value of π in the treatment where jar
9Each session included one additional subject who was paid $20 to serve as a monitor.
10The computer program used was similar to Battaglini, et al. [2005] as an extension to the open source
Multistage game software. See http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu.
131 was equivalent to state A in the model and jar 2 was equivalent to state B in the model.11
The balls were then shuﬄed in random order on each subject’s computer screen, with the ball
colors hidden. Each subject then privately selected one ball by clicking on it with the mouse
revealing the color of the ball to that subject only. The subject then chose whether to vote for
jar 1, vote for jar 2, or abstain. In the treatments without partisan bias, i.e. m =0 ,i ft h e
majority of the votes cast by the group were for the correct jar, each group member, regardless
of whether he or she voted, received a payoﬀ of 80 cents. If the majority of the votes cast by
the group were incorrect guesses, each group member, regardless of whether he or she voted,
received a payoﬀ of 5 cents. Ties were broken randomly. In the treatment with partisan bias,
subjects were told that the computer would cast m votes for jar 1 in each election. This was
repeated for 30 periods, with the variations in sequence, and with the group membership shuﬄed
randomly after each round for sessions with 14 subjects. Each subject was paid the sum of his
or her earnings over all 30 periods in cash at the end of the experiment. Average earnings were
approximately $20, plus a $10 show-up payment, with each session lasting about 60 minutes.
IV EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
IV.1 Voter Choices
IV.1.1 Informed Voters
Of the 2,520 voting decisions we observed, in 646 cases (25.63%) subjects were informed, that is,
revealed a red or yellow ball. Across all treatments and sequences, only one of these informed
voters chose incorrectly (voting for the wrong option). The remaining 645 informed subjects, if
revealed a red ball, voted for jar 1 (policy a) and if revealed a yellow ball, voted for jar 2 (policy
b). We interpret this as indicating that all subjects had a least a basic comprehension of the
task.
11We used a 10 sided die with numbers 0-9 when π =5 /9, where numbers 1-5 resulted in state A,n u m b e r s6 - 9
resulted in state B, and if a number 0 was thrown, the die was thrown until 1-9 appeared.
14IV.1.2 Uninformed Voters
Aggregate Choices Table 3 summarizes the aggregate choices of uninformed voters. In all
treatments we ﬁnd that uninformed voters abstain in large percentages compared to informed
voters and these diﬀerences are signiﬁcant.
When π =1 /2 we ﬁnd highly signiﬁcant evidence that the majority of uninformed voters
alter their voting choices as predicted by the swing voter’s curse theory and contrary to the
decision-theoretic sincere voting theory. When π =1 /2 and m =0 , uninformed voters abstain
91% of the time, vote for a less than one percent of the time, and vote for b 8% of the time.
However, with partisan bias, uninformed voters reduce abstention and increase their probability
of voting for b. The changes are all statistically signiﬁcant. In the case of m =4the observed
voting choices almost perfectly match the equilibium values; in the m =2treatment there is
signiﬁcantly less abstention than predicted by the theory (51% versus 64%).
Table 3: Uninformed Voter Choices
Partisan Bias Observations a b φ
π =1 /2
m =0 217 0.00 0.08 0.91
m =2 221 0.06 0.43 0.51
m =4 206 0.04 0.77 0.19
π =5 /9
m =0 404 0.20 0.07 0.73
m =2 410 0.12 0.35 0.53
m =4 416 0.16 0.56 0.28
We ﬁnd some support, however, for the sincere, decision-theoretic model of voting when
π =5 /9 as voting for a by uninformed voters is signiﬁcantly higher than when π =0 .5 for all
values of m.W e ﬁnd also that when we compare π =5 /9 with π =1 /2, uninformed voters
vote b signiﬁcantly less when m =2and m =4 . The direction of this eﬀect is as predicted, but
t h es i z eo ft h ee ﬀect is larger than predicted. Furthermore, subjects in the π =5 /9 treatments
abstain signiﬁcantly less than in the π =1 /2 case when m =0and m =4(which is contrary
to the prediction). The diﬀerence is explained by the signiﬁcantly positive voting for a (also
unpredicted). These diﬀerences as we vary π may also reﬂect sequence ordering eﬀects and
15learning by subjects. We explore these other explanations for these diﬀerences in the next
section.
Nevertheless, when π =5 /9 we again ﬁnd highly signiﬁcant evidence that uninformed voters
alter their voting choices with higher values of m as predicted by the swing voter’s curse theory
and contrary to the decision-theoretic theory. With partisan bias, the percent of uninformed
voters choosing b increases with m,f r o m7% to 35% to 56% for m =0 ,2,4, respectively. All of
these diﬀerences are highly signiﬁcant.
Individual Proﬁles Our within subject design enables us to compare how each individual
b e h a v e sa c r o s sd i ﬀerent treatments of m; that is, as a function of the number of partisans, and
thus we can control for individual speciﬁce ﬀects. In Table 4 below we classify the choices of
individuals by their proﬁles of behavior across values of m.S p e c i ﬁcally, we classify individuals
as to which choices they choose a majority of the time given a particular value of m and the
value of π in their session. That is, a subject represented in the ﬁrst column of percentages of
subjects abstained more than any other choice for all values of m, while a subject represented in
the second column abstained more than any other choice when m =0and m =2 , but voted for
b mostly when m =4 .12 Omitted proﬁles were not observed. The columns highlighted in bold
represent uninformed voter proﬁles that are overall consistent with the theoretical comparative
static predictions. As we see, the majority of voter proﬁles can be classiﬁed as overall consistent
(76 percent), although more so when π =1 /2 (89 percent) than when π =5 /9 (70 percent).
Thus, we ﬁnd that at the individual level, subjects overall voting patterns are consistent with the
observed aggregate voting patterns, which behavior largely consistent with the theory although
less so when π =5 /9.
12If a subject tied in a classiﬁcation, we classiﬁed him or her as abstaining mostly.
16Table 4: Percentages of Uninformed Voter Proﬁles
(Omitted Proﬁles Not Observed, Bold Consistent)
∅ =M o s t l yA b s t a i n ,a= Mostly Vote a, b = Mostly Vote b
m =0 ∅ a or b
m =2 ∅ b a ∅ b a
m =4 ∅ b a ∅ b a ∅ b ∅ b b a b a
π =1 /2 21 32 0 0 36 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
π =5 /9 18 25 4 2 25 0 4 2 5 2 4 4 0 7
Total 19 27 2 1 29 1 2 1 4 1 4 2 1 5
IV.2 Learning Eﬀects
Each subject participated in exactly one session with three diﬀerent m-treatments, each in a
sequence of 10 diﬀerent committees. Our within subjects design allows us to better measure the
eﬀects of varying m while holding subject speciﬁc factors constant, as illustrated in the individual
analysis of the previous section. We also varied the sequences in which subjects experienced
diﬀerent values of m in order to balance out any learning eﬀects that may arise from experience
with the committee voting task across all 30 committees a subject experienced. These features
of the experimental design enable us to examine three kinds of learning eﬀects. First, we can
examine whether subjects learn within a treatment. That is, are there any systematic trends
toward or away from the equilibrium predictions? Second, we can see whether there is any
signiﬁcant learning by a subject over the course of the entire set of 30 committees in which they
participated. Third, we can ask whether there are any important cross-treatment eﬀects.T h a t
is, are the ﬁndings reported in the previous section robust to the sequencing of treatments in
a session? We address the robustness question ﬁrst because it is especially relevant given that
diﬀerent sequences were used for diﬀerent sessions.13
IV.2.1 Sequencing eﬀects
Are the ﬁndings reported in the previous section robust to the sequencing of treatments in a
session? Table 5 displays choice behavior of uninformed voters, broken down by session and
13We are grateful to an anonymous referee of an earlier version for suggesting that that the ﬁndings of the study
would be more convincing if they did not depend on the treatment sequence, and if we obtained more data from
diﬀerent sequences. Two additional sequences for the π = .55 committees ((4,0,2) and (4,2,0)) were added to the
design in response to this concern about robustness.
17treatment.
Table 5: Percentage Uninformed Choices by Sequence
Voting for a is the Omitted Category
m =0 m =2 m =4
Sequence π ∅ b Obs. ∅ b Obs. ∅ b Obs.
(2,4,0) 1/2 92 7 111 54 38 112 18 80 99
(4,2,0) 1/2 90 9 106 49 48 109 20 75 107
(0,4,2) 5/9 67 3 98 59 35 98 30 66 89
(0,2,4) 5/9 79 10 105 67 26 107 44 52 117
(4,0,2) 5/9 63 16 101 43 39 109 18 47 107
(4,2,0) 5/9 81 0 100 43 41 96 19 61 103
F i g u r e1d i s p l a yt h er e l a t i v ev o t ec h o i c ef r e q u e n c i e sf o rt h e6d i ﬀerent treatments broken down
by session for π = .5 and π = .55. Several features of these data are striking. First, all of the
comparative static observations noted in the aggregate analysis of the previous section are also
observed in every single session regardless of sequence. In every session, there are sharp changes
in behavior following a change in partisan bias. Second all these comparative static observations
are consistent with swing voter’s curse theory. If partisanship goes up between two treatments
in a session, then voting for b goes up and abstention goes down. Thus, the obvious conclusion
is that the results are robust to whatever sequencing eﬀects may or may not exist. Any learning
of this sort is minor and has no eﬀect on the conclusions of this study.
We can also ask about the statistical signiﬁcance of the comparative statics, session by
session. Although this vastly reduces the sample size for each test, we nonetheless still ﬁnd that
most of these comparative statics tests are still signiﬁcant.
First, in all sequences there is signiﬁcantly more voting for b when m =2or m =4compared
to m =0 .14 Furthermore, there is signiﬁcantly more voting for b when m =4compared to
m =2in all but one sequence.15 The one exception is in the sequence when m =( 4 ,0,2) and
π =5 /9 where the diﬀerence, although positive, is not statistically signiﬁcant.16 These ﬁndings
of signiﬁcance for nearly all sequences, even with rather small samples, as further support of the
robustness of this phenomenon.17
14All of the comparisons are signiﬁcant at a p value of less than 1%.
15All of the comparisons are signiﬁcant at a p value of less than 1%.
16The p value for the conparison is 14%.
17Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2008) demonstrate robustness with respect to group size as well, considering
18Figure 1: Voting behavior by session: pi=.50 and pi=.55.
19Second, by disaggregating by sequence we can compare uninformed voter behavior across
values of π controlling for sequence since we use sequence (4,2,0) for both values. As we found
in the aggregate data, uninformed voters in this sequence vote signiﬁcantly more for a across all
values of m when π =5 /9. We also ﬁnd that when π =5 /9, voters vote signiﬁcantly less for b
compared to π =5 /9 when m =0and when m =4(as theoretically predicted for the case when
m =4 ) . Thus, the results in the disaggregated data are largely similar to those found in the
aggregate data. Furthermore, we ﬁnd the pattern of choices by uninformed voters to support
the swing voter’s curse theory for both values of π.
Third, by examining voter behavior by sequence, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant sequence
aﬀects between pairs of sequences. There is a minor diﬀerence when we compare the two
sequences used when π =1 /2:w e ﬁnd that uninformed voters in the sequence (4,2,0) vote
more for b when m =2and less for b when m =4than uninformed voters in the sequence
(2,4,0). However, these diﬀerences in choices are not signiﬁcant, and in any case may simply
reﬂect relatively inexperienced behavior in the ﬁrst 10 periods in both cases.
Finally, we check for robustness of individual voter proﬁles with respect to treatment se-
quencing. In Table 6 we disaggregate the voter classiﬁcation analysis of Table 5 above by
sequence. Note that we again ﬁnd that disaggregated by sequence, the majority of uninformed
subjects make choices that are overall consistent with the comparative static predictions of the
theory. We do ﬁn ds o m ev a r i a t i o ni nt h ec h o i c e so fp r o ﬁles that are inconsistent when π =5 /9;
in particular subjects who experience the m =4treatment ﬁrst are more likely to err by voting
instead of abstaining when m =0or to vote speciﬁcally for a when m =2or m =4 ,t h a n
subjects who experience the m =0treatment ﬁrst. However, our results above show that even
accounting for these sequencing eﬀects, the comparative static predictions of the theory hold.
committees two or three times the size of the committees studied in this article.
20Table 6: Percentages of Uninformed Voter Proﬁles
(Omitted Proﬁles Not Observed, Bold Consistent with Pred.)
∅ =M o s t l yA b s t a i n ,a= Mostly Vote a, b = Mostly Vote b
m =0 ∅ a or b
m =2 ∅ b a ∅ b a
m =4 ∅ b a ∅ b a ∅ b ∅ b b a b a
Seq. π
(2,4,0) 1/2 21 36 0 0 36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0
(4,2,0) 1/2 21 29 0 0 36 7 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0
(0,4,2) 5/9 7 21 0 0 43 0 7 0 14 7 0 0 0 0
(0,2,4) 5/9 36 29 0 0 21 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 7
(4,0,2) 5/9 14 21 14 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 14 7 0 14
(4,2,0) 5/9 14 29 0 7 21 0 7 7 0 0 0 7 0 7
IV.2.2 Learning eﬀects within a treatment
Given that we have established that our comparative static predictions are robust to sequencing
eﬀects, we now examine whether the data demonstrates learning eﬀects. We ﬁrst examine
learning within a treatment (in this subsection) and then learning within a session (in the next
subsection). If learning is occurring within a treatment we would expect that observed voter
choices would converge to the choice frequencies predicted in equilibrium. We measure whether
this convergence is occurring by examining the eﬀect of time on the Euclidean distance between
aggregate observed voters choices in a period with the predicted voter choice frequencies in that
period given π and m. That is, assume that this Euclidean Distance, labeled ED, is a function
o ft h ep e r i o di nag i v e nt r e a t m e n t ,t, such that the overall voting frequencies converge to the
predicted frequencies with time as follows [where Obsjt represents the observed frequency of
choice j in t, σjt represents the Bayesian Nash equilibrium predicted probability of choice j in
t,a n dμ has a mean of zero and a constant variance]:
ED =
q
(Obs∅t − σ∅t)
2 +( Obsat − σat)
2 +( Obsbt − σbt)
2 =
β1
t
+
β2
t2 +
β3
t3 + μ
Then, limt→∞ E(ED|t)=0 .
We estimate this equation using simple OLS with the constant term suppressed for the data
pooled across treatments which we report in Table 7a below and also disaggregated by π and
21m which we report in Table 7b below. Figure 2 graphs the predicted estimates of Euclidean
Distance versus the observed values by π and m.
Table 7a: Regression Estimations of Euclidean Distance
As Functions of Period in Treatment (Constant Suppressed)
Independent Variable Coeﬃcient Robust Std. Err. t Pr > |t|
All Data Pooled, R2 =0 .69, Obs. = 180
Period Inverse 2.22 0.18 12.13 0.00
Period Squared Inverse −4.93 0.74 −6.64 0.00
Period Cubed Inverse 3.04 0.58 5.21 0.00
Table 7b: Regression Estimations of Euclidean Distance
As Functions of Period in Treatment (Constant Suppressed)
Independent Variable Coeﬃcient Robust Std. Err. t Pr > |t|
π =1 /2,m=0 ,R 2 =0 .75, Obs. = 20
Period Inverse 1.06 0.20 5.34 0.00
Period Squared Inverse −2.26 0.96 −2.35 0.03
Period Cubed Inverse 1.34 0.81 1.66 0.12
π =1 /2,m=2 , Adj. R2 =0 .76, Obs. = 20
Period Inverse 2.15 0.43 5.03 0.00
Period Squared Inverse −5.44 1.41 −3.87 0.00
Period Cubed Inverse 3.48 1.01 3.45 0.00
π =1 /2,m=4 , Adj. R2 =0 .64, Obs. = 20
Period Inverse 1.00 0.35 2.87 0.01
Period Squared Inverse −1.74 1.25 −1.39 0.18
Period Cubed Inverse 0.86 0.92 0.95 0.36
π =5 /9,m=0 , Adj. R2 =0 .85, Obs. = 40
Period Inverse 3.18 0.38 8.30 0.00
Period Squared Inverse −7.41 1.48 −4.99 0.00
Period Cubed Inverse 4.81 1.14 4.23 0.00
π =5 /9,m=2 , Adj. R2 =0 .76, Obs. = 40
Period Inverse 2.11 0.36 5.82 0.00
Period Squared Inverse −4.60 1.56 −2.96 0.01
Period Cubed Inverse 2.78 1.22 2.28 0.03
π =5 /9,m=4 , Adj. R2 =0 .73, Obs. = 40
Period Inverse 2.60 0.43 6.05 0.00
Period Squared Inverse −5.44 1.83 −2.98 0.01
Period Cubed Inverse 3.25 1.47 2.21 0.03
Our results suggest that there is signiﬁcant learning within all of the treatments, although
subjects in the treatments with π =1 /2 demonstrate less learning than those in the treatments
with π =5 /9, which is primarily explained by the fact that subjects in the treatments with
π =5 /9 generally made choices more at variance with the predicted frequencies in early periods
in a treatment than those in the treatments with π =1 /2.
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Figure 2: Predicted versus actual euclidean distance.
IV.2.3 Experience eﬀects within a session
We also estimate possible learning across an entire 30 committee session, which would be at-
tributable to task learning. The simplest way to determine if there is overall task learning is to
look at how the frequency of voting for a changes over time. In the Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
voting for b to vary with m, theoretically subjects should not vote for a regardless of the value
of m. Evidence that subjects decrease their voting for a over time would demonstrate learning,
in the sense of convergence to the Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
In order to determine whether such learning occurs, we estimated two pooled probit equations
for each value of π for voting for a as a function of the period in a sequence, clustered by subject.
The results of these estimations is summarized in Table 7 below.18 We ﬁnd that voting for a
declines with the number of periods in all the sequences, however, it is insigniﬁcant for sequences
(0,4,2) and (4,2,0) when π =5 /9 and signiﬁcant only at the 10% level for sequence (4,2,0)
when π =1 /2. Although more “learning” occurs in some sequences than others, there does
18We also estimated equations where the period variables enter nonlinearly with comparable results.
23not to be a particular pattern that is advantaged. Moreover, signiﬁcant learning requires that
subjects make poorer choices at the begining of the sequence than at the end, so signiﬁcant
eﬀects may simple reﬂect sequences where subjects made poorer choices in the ﬁrst treatments.
Finally, we conducted tests whether the marginal eﬀects were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent by sequence.
We could not reject the null hypothesis that the marginal eﬀects were equal across sequences.
Table 7: Probit Estimations of Uninformed a Votes
As Functions of Period in Sequence (Clustered by Subject)
Ind. Var. Marg. Eﬀ. Robust Std. Err. z Pr > |z|
π =1 /2
Period in (2,4,0) -0.003 0.002 -4.11 0.00
Period in (4,2,0) -0.002 0.002 -1.81 0.07
Log Pseudolikelihood = -89.08, Pseudo R2 =0 .07, Obs. = 644
π =5 /9
Period in (0,4,2) -0.004 0.004 -1.14 0.25
Period in (0,2,4) -0.01 0.003 -3.29 0.00
Period in (4,0,2) -0.01 0.005 -2.16 0.03
Period in (4,2,0) -0.003 .003 -0.93 0.35
Log Pseudolikelihood = -501.83, Pseudo R2 =0 .06, Obs. = 1230
In summary, we ﬁnd that there are some diﬀerences in uninformed voter behavior related to
the diﬀerent sequences used. Nevertheless, despite these diﬀerences we ﬁnd, as noted above, that
the comparative static predictions of the swing voter’s curse theory hold within each sequence.
We interpret this as strong support for the theory.
IV.3 Alternative Models with Bounded Rationality
So far we have adopted Nash equilibrium behavior as the leading benchmark to explain the
data. As discussed above, in our voting environment the predictions of the Nash equilibrium
provide a good ﬁt. Can alternative behavioral models provide a similar or better ﬁt? As
we said, the data unequivocally reject decision theoretic models that postulate no strategic
sophistication. The literature, however, provides a wide range of alternative models of bounded
strategic sophistication. It would be impossible to discuss all of them here, so we focus on
three approaches that have received particular attention in recent work: ﬁrst, the so called Level
k theories; second, the Analogy-Based Expectations and Cursed Equilibria; ﬁnally the Quantal
24Response Equilibrium.
IV.3.1 Bounded rationality I: Strategic Sophistication
One recent approach to bounded rationality in games is to relax the assumption that players
have perfectly accurate beliefs about how the other players in the game are making their choices.
The models proposed by Nagel [1995], Stahl and Wilson [1995], and Camerer, Ho, and Chong
[2004] posit diversity in the population with respect to levels of strategic sophistication. These
“Level-k” models are anchored by the lowest level types, or “Level-0 players”, who are completely
naive. In the speciﬁc context of the swing voter’s curse, the obvious way to deﬁne level 0 players
is that they do not condition on being pivotal, and simply vote their posterior belief of the state,
as in the decision theoretic model. Higher types are more sophisticated, but have imperfect
beliefs about how others will be playing the game. In the model by Stahl and Wilson [1995] and
Crawford and Irriberri [2006], that we adopt here as a benchmark, Level-k players are assumed
to optimize relative to beliefs that they face a world of only level-(k − 1) players. The number
of levels is in principle unbounded.19
It is easy to characterize the predictions of this model in our speciﬁc voting environment.
Informed voters have a dominant strategy: so, as in the Nash equilibrium and in the data, they
always vote for their signal, regardless of their degree of sophistication. The behavior of the
uniformed voters would depend on the treatment. Consider ﬁrst the case where m =0and
π =1 /2. A level 0 voter would either abstain or choose A or B with the same probabilities.
G i v e nt h i s ,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a tf o rl e v e lk>0, uniformed voters would always abstain,which is
in line with the Nash equilibrium and with the empirical ﬁndings.20 In all the other treatments,
however, the predictions of the Level k model sharply diverges from the Nash equilibrium and
the data. Consider m =0and π>1/2. In this case uninformed level-0 types would vote for
19Camerer, Ho and Chong [2004] propose an alternative model in which each level k players believes that other
players’ types are distributed between 0 and k − 1 a c c o r d i n gt oaP o i s s o nw i t hm e a nτ.
20Since the informed voters vote their signal sincerely, conditional on being pivotal, it would be more likely that
a level 1 voter votes against the vote of an informed voter than in favor, so he would prefer to abstain. Similarly,
if level k-1 voters abstain, then the same reasoning is true for level k voters.
25A,w h i l el e v e lk>0 uninformed voters would vote for A if k is even and B if k is odd. The
intuition is the following: given that all level k−1 are voting for the same policy, say A,t h el e v e l
k’s would realize that event B is more likely in the pivotal event, since it can occur only if all
the informed voters voted B, so they would choose to vote for B. Independently of the choice of
distribution of types, therefore the model would predict zero abstention.21 The remaining cases
are similar. When m>0 and π =1 /2, level 0 would randomly vote for A,B or abstain with
equal probability. Level 1 would vote for B for the same reason as above: in the pivotal event
the bias introduced by the partisans would make B more likely. Level 2 would then react by
always voting A (given the experimental parameters): this because the vote of the uninformed
voters overcompensates the bias of the partisans. Level 3 would then vote for B with probability
one, and so forth: even types k>0 vote B and odd types vote A. Finally, consider the case
m>0 and π>1/2. Level 0 votes A, since the prior favors this option. Level 1 then reacts
by all voting B. As above, level 2 would then vote A, etc.: odd types vote A; even types vote
B. Such behavior is completely inconsistent with our data. First it fails to explain abstention
in the treatment m>0, π>1/2. Second, it misses the key comparative statics in treatment
m>0, π =1 /2: abstention is decreasing in m.H o w e v e r , t h e l e v e l k model implies abstention
rates that are constant in m,s i n c ei tw o u l dd e p e n do n l yo nt h ef r a c t i o no fl e v e l0v o t e r s . I nt h e
light of this evidence, we conclude that the level k model does not provide a good explanation
of the data, and it is dominated by Nash equilibrium.
IV.3.2 The Cursed and Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibria
We now discuss two equilibrium concepts that give similar predictions for the swing voter’s curse:
Eyster and Rabin’s [2005] Cursed equilibrium and Jehiel and Koessler’s [2006] Analogy-Based
21The distribution of types is irrelevant because a type k believes that all other types are of type k − 1.I t i s
easy to see that assuming that beliefs on other types follow a Poisson distribution with mean τ as in Camerer,
Ho and Chong [2004] would not solve the problems of the k−level models. Regardless of assumption on beliefs,
types 0 and 1 would always vote, and always vote for either a or b. As it can be easily seen from Table 7, the
fraction of voters that vote in this way is 0 in our experiment. Given that we have 84 distinct subjects, assuming
(for example) a Poisson distribution of types, the event in which there are no type 0 or 1 in our experiment would
have a signiﬁcant probability only if τ is very large. Camerer et al. [2003], however estimate a value between 0
and 2.
26Expectation equilibrium.
The idea of the cursed equilibrium was introduced by Eyster and Rabin [2005]. It postulates
that players correctly anticipate the marginal distribution of the choices (i.e., votes for A,v o t e s
for B, and abstentions) of the other players in the game, but make mistakes in updating their
beliefs in the pivotal event: speciﬁcally, by failing to account for the correlation between the
other players’ information and their decisions. In our voting environment, the equilibrium logic
requires players to understand that informed voters will vote their information, i.e., there is a
strong correlation, while in the “cursed” equilibrium, voters would not take this correlation into
account when deciding how to vote. This would lead all voters, both informed and uninformed,
to simply vote their prior (or posterior) belief, and hence the predictions correspond exactly
with the decision theoretic model.
There is also a “partially cursed” equilibrium, which makes more subtle predictions about
behavior, and is a realistic hybrid of fully cursed and fully rational behavior. In a partially
cursed equilibrium, players form beliefs that partially takes account of the correlation, so for our
game the predictions would generally lie somewhere between the fully rational Nash equilibrium
and decision theoretic model. Formally, in an X-cursed equilibrium, the equilibrium strategy is
derived based on beliefs that voter vote naively with probability X and vote according to the
equilibrium strategy with probability 1 − X.W h e n X =1(“fully cursed”) voters follow the
decision theoretic model; when X =0 , they play Nash equilibrium model. This is therefore an
extension of the Nash equilibrium, and as such can not do worse than it: by adding an additional
free parameter (X) this model can therefore ﬁne tune the prediction of the Nash equilibrium.
The cursed equilibrium can be seen as a special case of a more general equilibrium concept
introduced by Jehiel and Koessler [2006]: the Analogy-Based Expectation equilibrium (hence-
forth ABEE). According to this equilibrium concept players are boundedly rational because
they bundle states of nature in which opponents may be in "analogy classes" and play best
27response to the opponents’ average strategies in these analogy classes.22
What are the predictions of the cursed equilibrium in the voting model described above?
Consider the cursed equilibrium ﬁr s t . T h ec a s ew i t hm =0 ,π=1 /2 is relatively straightfor-
ward. Informed voters would vote their signal. The uniformed voters would always abstain,
regardless of the level of X. So voters would behave in a cursed equilibrium exactly as in a
Nash equilibrium. The cases of the remaining treatments are more complicated and depend on
the choice of parameters. Consider the case m =0 , π>1/2.I f X is high, than the posterior
probability that the state is A for an uninformed voter would be larger than 1/2, and the voter
would vote for A. So if we want to explain abstention, we need to assume X suﬃciently small,
which implies a behavior close to a Nash equilibrium. In this particular treatment, however, we
observe in the data a signiﬁcant fraction of votes cast for A. The cursed equilibrium may con-
tribute in explaining this phenomenon if we assume that the population is composed by agents
with diﬀerent degrees of cursedness. This indeed may be supported by the individual behavior
analysis discussed in the next to last section of the paper, where we show that a signiﬁcant frac-
tion of agents is composed of agents who vote A with probability one when m =0and π>1/2.
The cases with m>0 and π>1/2 are similar: here too the cursed equilibrium may explain why
agents vote for A, though this is a much less frequent phenomenon than with m =0 . Finally
consider the case with m>0 and π =1 /2, here the cursedness of the equilibrium would tend
to reduce the incentives to vote for B, so it would skew downward the fraction of votes for B.
We do not observe this phenomenon in the data: in fact the fraction of votes for B is almost
exactly equal to the Nash prediction.
In summary the Cursed Equilibrium can explain the data if we assume, respectively, suf-
ﬁciently low level of cursedness. The bias introduced by the degree of cursedness, however,
22To see the relationship with the cursed equilibrium, assume that agent i believes that a subset ni of the set of
players N will use the same strategy no matter what their signal is, but they anticipate their strategy consistently
with their correct average equilibrium strategies. If ni = N − i the agent would not update beliefs conditioning
on the pivotal event, and so he would behave naively according to his private information as in a fully cursed
equilibrium. On the contrary, when ∀in i = ∅ voters would fully condition their expectations on the pivotal
event, and we have a Nash equilibrium. For intermediate cases, we can have diﬀerent forms of partially cursed
equilibria.
28sometimes pushes the model in the wrong direction and performs worse than a simple Nash
equilibrium (if we assume that the degree of cursedness is positive). On the other hand, by
adding an additional degree of freedom in ﬁtting the data it may contribute in explaining the
votes cast for A in treatments with π>1/2 that can not be explained by the Nash equilibrium.
IV.3.3 Quantal Response Equilibrium
Quantal response equilibrium (henceforth QRE) applies stochastic choice theory to strategic
games, and is motivated by the idea that a decision maker may take a suboptimal action. In a
QRE, the probability of choosing a strategy is a continuous increasing function of the expected
payoﬀ of using that strategy, and strategies with higher payoﬀs are used with higher probability
than strategies with lower payoﬀs. Since expected utilities depend on players’ strategies, this
deﬁnes a quantal response stochastic choice function that maps the strategy space to itself.
A quantal response equilibrium is then a ﬁxed point of the quantal response stochastic choice
function (see McKelvey and Palfrey [1995, 1998]). In a logit equilibrium, for any two strategies,
the stochastic choice function is given by logit function, described below, with free parameter λ
that indexes responsiveness of choices to payoﬀs (or the slope of the logit curve).23 That is:
σij =
eλUij(σ)
P
k∈Si eλUik(σ) for all i, j ∈ Si
where σij is the probability i chooses strategy j and Uij (σ) is the equilibrium expected payoﬀ
to i if i chooses decision j and the players’ strategy proﬁle is σ. These expected payoﬀsa r eo f
course also conditioned on any information that i might have. Note that a higher λ reﬂects a
"more precise" response to the payoﬀs. The extreme cases λ =0and λ → +∞ correspond to
the pure noise (completely random behavior) and Nash equilibrium, respectively. Therefore, as
with the Cursed equilibrium, by adding a free paramether (λ), logit QRE has more ﬂexibility
than the Nash equilibrium to ﬁt the data.
It is straightforward to apply this to the swing voters curse game. The strategies that voters
23The free parameter can also be interpreted as the inverse of the variance of the players’ estimates of the
expected payoﬀso fd i ﬀerent strategies.
29choose stochastically are A, B,a n dφ, and the quantal response equilibrium choice probabilities
of uninformed voters for a given value of λ, {σλ
A,σλ
B,σλ
φ} depend on the utility diﬀerences uA−uB,
uA − uφ, and uB − uφ, expressions for which are derived in the appendix.24
We use maximum likelihood to estimate a single value of λ for the pooled dataset consisting
of all observations of uninformed voter decisions in all 6 treatments. The results are in Table 8.
Table 8: Quantal Response Analysis
QRE Frequencies Obs. Frequencies
π m A B φ A B φ lnL #obs
0.5 0 0.21 0.21 0.58 0.00 0.08 0.91 −138.96 217
5/9 0 0.24 0.19 0.57 0.20 0.07 0.73 −329.62 404
0.5 2 0.07 0.42 0.51 0.06 0.43 0.51 −193.08 221
5/9 2 0.09 0.40 0.51 0.12 0.35 0.53 −393.67 410
0.5 4 0.01 0.70 0.29 0.04 0.77 0.19 −143.60 206
5/9 4 0.02 0.67 0.32 0.16 0.56 0.28 −504.12 416
Columns 3-5 of the table present the QRE-predicted values of choice frequencies, evaluated at
the estimated b λ =3 1 . The next three columns give the observed choice frequencies in the data.
Column 9 reports the value of the log likelihood function restricted to the observations in the
speciﬁc treatment, and the last column gives the number of observations in that treatment. A
scatter diagram of the QRE-predicted frequencies and the observed choice frequencies is shown
in Figure 3. The observed and predicted values are highly correlated: the regression line through
this collection of points has a slope equal to 0.71, an intercept of 0.09, and R2 > 0.80.T h e r ei s
no obvious pattern of overprediction or under prediction.
It is useful to compare this with cursed equilibrium. As explained above, both cursed
equilibrium and QRE, cannot do worse at ﬁtting data than Nash equilibrium, because both
subsume the Nash equilibrium as a special case and each has a free parameter that regulates
how far away the model is from Nash equilibrium. The free parameters, however, play diﬀerent
roles in the two models. In the cursed equilibrium, a higher X leads to a distinct monotonic
bias on the outcome in favor of "naive behavior". When π>1/2, this helps to ﬁt the data,
24With our experimental parameters, the logit equilibria are unique. To simplify the computational problem of
numerically ﬁnding solutions for the logit equilbrium, we do not model the choices of informed voters as stochastic,
and simply assume they always vote their signal (as, in fact, they did).
30Figure 3: QRE-predicted frequencies compared to the observed choice frequencies.
which is indeed characterized by the same type of bias; but when m>0 and π =1 /2,t h i sb i a s
against strategic behavior makes the Cursed equilibrium underestimate the probability that
uninformed independents vote against the partisans. The QRE does not add a systematic bias
for naive behavior because it does not require an ex ante assumption on how beliefs are updated:
λ regulates the intensity of the noise that is added in a player’s decision, but it does not aﬀect
the Bayesian process by which beliefs are updated given the other players’ strategies.
An additional feature of the data, which is captured in the QRE model is that the probability
an uninformed voter chooses A is higher when π =5 /9 than when π =1 /2, and this relationship
holds for every value of λ. This is quite intuitive, because the naive strategy of voting with your
prior is obviously not as bad if the prior is further from 1/2,s i n c e ,ap r i o r i ,b yd o i n gs oy o u
will vote correctly more often than not. Of course it is still not optimal because of the pivot
calculations and the swing voter’s curse, but as π becomes further from .5,t h es w i n gv o t e r ’ s
curse diminshes. In our data, we do ﬁnd signiﬁcantly more voting for A when π =5 /9 than
π =1 /2, for all three values of m. Another prediction of QRE is that the frequency of voting
31for A should be decreasing in m. The data show no systematic relationship between m and the
frequency of voting for A.
IV.4 Committee Decisions
Eﬃciency of Committee Choices
In the previous subsection we averaged across all committees within a treatment or focused on
individual voter choices. We now turn to an analysis of committee decisions. First we examine
the eﬃciency of committee choices as deﬁned by the percentage of times committees make the
correct choice. We ﬁnd not surprisingly that committees make correct decisions is highest when
there were zero computer voters (97% when π =1 /2 and 94% when π =5 /9).25 Eﬃciency
declines when there were two computer voters (77% when π =1 /2 and 91% when π =5 /9)
which is signiﬁcantly lower than the case with zero computer voters at the 2% level when π =1 /2
and insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent when π =5 /9.26 Eﬃciency is lowest when there were four computer
voters (66% when π =1 /2 and 71% when π =5 /9) which is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent with two
computer voters when π =1 /2 but signiﬁcantly diﬀerent when π =5 /9.27 Although when
computer voters are introduced eﬃciency is lower when π =1 /2 compared to the case when
π =5 /9, these diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant at conventional levels.28
In Table 9 below we summarize the mean eﬃciency results by the state of the world and
treatment (with ties coded as 0.5) compared to the mean predicted eﬃciencies given the number
25We code tie elections which were randomly decided as a 50% correct decision.
26The t statistics are 2.5 and 0.74 for π =1 /2 and π =5 /9, respectively.
27The t statistics are 1.03 and 2.38 for π =1 /2 and π =5 /9, respectively.
28The t statistics of the comparison of π =1 /2 and π =5 /9 are 0.55, 1.52, and 0.49 for m =0 ,2,4, respectively.
32of informed voters in each period and predicted voting behavior.
Table 9: Mean Eﬃciency By Treatment
Treatment True State Cases Actual Predicted
π m
0.5 0 State A 9 0.94 1
State B 8 1 1
5/9 0 State A 28 1 1
State B 19 0.87 1
0.5 2 State A 15 0.53 0.98
State B 16 1 0.99
5/9 2 State A 20 0.83 0.99
State B 17 1 0.98
0.5 4 State A 15 0.30 0.93
State B 16 1 0.98
5/9 4 State A 25 0.46 0.84
State B 22 1 0.98
Information, Turnout, and Closeness
Theoretically, we expect that as the number of informed voters increases, the turnout level will
increase from σB to 1. That is, in equilibrium informed voters vote 100% of the time, while
uninformed voters cast votes with probability σB.W e ﬁnd that this is indeed in our data. Since
informed voters participated 100% of the time, while uninformed voters participate much less,
as the number of informed voters increases, turnout in the committees mechanically increases.
Furthermore, as the number of informed voters in a committee increases, turnout increases,
it also increases the margin of victory for the winning outcome. This follows because informed
voters, 99% of the time, voted for the same policy (the correct jar) while uninformed voters
abstained more and also sometimes voted for the incorrect option. Hence, as the number of
informed voters increases, the margin of victory increases mechanically as well.
These two relationships have an interesting implication. A common perceived prediction of
the rational model of voting based on voting costs is that turnout should be positively related to
the expected closeness of an election since when elections are expected to be close, votes are more
likely to be pivotal, and thus the investment beneﬁts from voting are greater (see for example
Filer, et al. [1993]). However, in our analysis, closeness and turnout are negatively related since
33increasing the number of informed voters increases the margin of victory (decreasing closeness)
while it increases turnout. These results imply that simple tests of the eﬀect of closeness on
turnout decisions or aggregate turnout are not nuanced enough to determine if voters are making
participation decisions rationally.
The cost of voting may be a factor aﬀecting the exact relationship between participation
and the margin of victory, but one could easily have a positive correlation between turnout and
participation even if the cost of voting is positive.29 T h ek e yd e t e r m i n a n ti nt h er e l a t i o n s h i p
between closeness and turnout with small voting costs is whether there is suﬃcient heterogeneity
in preferences and information. The informed nonpartisan voters always vote with higher
probability than the uninformed voters, and always vote for the candidate most preferred by
nonpartisans. If the cost of voting is not too high, uninformed voters vote only to oﬀset the
bias introduced by the partisans. If therefore participation of the uninformed voters is high
enough to oﬀset the partisans, an increase in informed voters implies an increase in participation
and of the margin of victory as well. This positive relationship may be weakened if the cost
of voting is high enough to prevent the uninformed nonpartisans from voting with suﬃciently
high probability, and therefore one can have situations in which participation and the margin of
victory are not positively related. The sign of the relationship, however, depends more on the
details of the environment (heterogeneity in information, cost of voting, number of partisans)
rather than on the rationality or strategic savvy of the players. The key point is that, when
confronting ﬁeld data, there is no reason a priori to expect one eﬀect to dominate another, and
therefore the relationship between turnout and margin of victory could go in either direction
and still be consistent with a rational choice theory of voting.
29To see this, consider the case in which the cost of voting is small enough that both uninformed and informed
voters ﬁnd it optimal to vote. Since uninformed nonpartisan voters have a strictly dominant strategy to vote
informatively when the cost of voting c is 0, by continuity they would still continue to vote in the same way
when c is suﬃciently small. In addition to this, from the equilibrium conditions discussed in Section II.1 and
II.2, it is easy to see that the behavior of uninformed non partisans is continuous in the cost of voting (conditions
uA − uφ =0and uB − uφ =0would become uA − uφ = c and uB − uφ = c). So having a small positive cost of
voting would reduce the equilibrium value of participation, but it would not change the comparative statics and
it would have only a small eﬀect on behavior.
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Signiﬁcant evidence exists that voters often choose to abstain when voting is apparently cost-
less and the standard rational model of voting would predict participation. Empirical analysis
suggests that such abstention may be related to diﬀerences in voter information. The swing
voter’s curse theory provides a complicated game theoretic explanation for why uninformed vot-
ers would be willing to abstain and delegate decision making to more informed voters. Hence,
it may be seen as an unlikely candidate explanation for the empirical evidence that lower in-
formation elections have lower turnout. In this paper we have provided the ﬁrst experimental
test of the theory, where we control for key parameters of the model, which are diﬃcult to
measure precisely or control for in naturally occuring data. We ﬁnd strong support for the
theory. Uninformed voters behave strategically: they strategically abstain when uninformed
and both outcomes are equally likely, delegating their votes to more informed voters. With
partisan bias, they vote strategically to balance out the votes of partisans, at probabilities close
to equilibrium, increasing the probability of voting as partisan bias increases. Even when the
partisan-favored outcome is the more likely outcome we ﬁnd most voters balancing in this way.
These results are supported at both the aggregate and individual level and across sessions and
treatment conﬁgurations.
We also ﬁnd that turnout and margin of victory both increase with the number of informed
voters and that there is a positive relationship between these two variables, contrary to the
common view that rational models of turnout predict that closeness and turnout should be
positively related. These results suggest that tests using ﬁeld data of whether turnout is related
to closeness, which are unable to control for information asymmetries, are inadequate or at best
very weak tests of rational voting models.
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V I . 1 P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Let uθ for θ = A,B be the expected utility of an uninformed swing voter of voting for policy θ.
To evaluate uA−uB there are only three relevant events: P0, the event when there is a tie among
the other voters between A and B;a n dPθ for θ = A,B, which is the event in which policy θ is
losing by one vote. The expected net utility of voting for A rather than B conditional on event
Pi is
E (uA − uB |Pi)=
½
Pr(A|Pi) − 0.5 i = A,B
2Pr(A|Pi) − 1 i =0
We can therefore write:
uA − uB =[ π Pr(P0 |A) − (1 − π)Pr(P0 |B)] +
1
2
X
i=A,B
Pr(Pi)(2Pr(A|Pi) − 1) (2)
=[ π Pr(P0 |A) − (1 − π)Pr(P0 |B)] +
1
2
∙
π Pr(PB |A) − (1 − π)Pr(PB |B)
+π Pr(PA |A) − (1 − π)Pr(PA |B)
¸
(3)
=
µ
Λ0 +
1
2
Λ1
¶
(4)
where Λ0 =[ π Pr(P0 |A) − (1 − π)Pr(P0 |B)] and
Λ1 = π Pr(PB |A) − (1 − π)Pr(PB |B)+π Pr(PA |A) − (1 − π)Pr(PA |B)
Consider Λ1 ﬁrst. Since n is odd, we can write:
Λ1 =
n−3
2 X
j=0
⎛
⎝ (n − 1)!
³
n−(2j+1)
2
´
!
³
n−2−(2j+1)
2
´
!(2j +1 ) !
⎞
⎠[(1 − p)σφ]
(2j+1)
·[p +( 1− p)(1− σφ)] ·
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
π
∙
p(1 − p)σB
+(1− p)
2 σAσB
¸n−(2j+1)−2
2
−(1 − π)
∙
p(1 − p)σA
+(1− p)
2 σAσB
¸n−(2j+1)−2
2
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
Consider now Λ0.W e c a n w r i t e :
Λ0 =
n−1
2 X
j=0
⎛
⎝ (n − 1)!
³
n−1−2j
2
´
!
³
n−1−2j
2
´
!(2j)!
⎞
⎠[(1 − p)σφ]
2j
·
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
π
h
p(1 − p)σB +( 1− p)
2 σAσB
in−1−2j
2
−(1 − π)
h
p(1 − p)σA +( 1− p)
2 σAσB
in−1−2j
2
⎫
⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎭
> 0
36Assume by contradiction that σB >σ A.S i n c e π ≥ 1
2, we conclude that Λ1 > 0 and Λ0 > 0.S o
uA−uB > 0, which implies that σB ≤ σA, a contradiction. We conclude that σA ≥ σB.W h e n
π = 1
2 we can make the symmetric argument and prove σB ≥ σA.H e n c e π = 1
2 ⇒ σB = σA.
¥
V I . 2 P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
If σB > 0, then the voter must be indiﬀerent between the two alternatives since σA ≥ σB
∀π ≥ 1
2. Assume this is the case, then:
0=uA − uB =P r[ P0] · [2Pr(A|P0) − 1]
+
1
2
Pr[PA] · [2Pr(A|PA) − 1]v +
1
2
Pr[PB] · [2Pr(A|PB) − 1]
This equation implies:
[πPr(P0 |A) − (1 − π)Pr(P0 |B)] (5)
=
1
2
[(1 − π)Pr(PB |B) − π Pr(PB |A)] +
1
2
[(1 − π)Pr(PA |B)+π Pr(PA |A)]
Moreover, we have:
uA − uφ =
1
2
[πPr(P0 |A) − (1 − π)Pr(P0 |B)] +
1
2
[π Pr(PA |A) − (1 − π)Pr(PA |B)] (6)
Substituting (5) in (6), we obtain:
uA − uφ =
1
4
π[Pr(PA |A) − Pr(PB |A)] +
1
4
(1 − π)[Pr(PB |B) − Pr(PA |B)]
We can compute:
Pr(PB |B)=
n−3
2 X
j=0
Φ(j)
h
p(1 − p)σA +( 1− p)
2 σAσB
i
p +( 1− p)σB
n−(2j+1)
2
Pr(PB |A)=
n−3
2 X
j=0
Φ(j)
h
p(1 − p)σB +( 1− p)
2 σAσB
i
(1 − p)σB
n−(2j+1)
2
37and
Pr(PA |A)=
n−3
2 X
j=0
Φ(j)
h
p(1 − p)σB +( 1− p)
2 σAσB
i
p +( 1− p)σA
n−(2j+1)
2
Pr(PA |B)=
n−3
2 X
j=0
Φ(j)
h
p(1 − p)σA +( 1− p)
2 σAσB
i
(1 − p)σA
n−(2j+1)
2
where: Φ(j)=
Ã
(n−1)! 
n−(2j+1)
2

!

n−2−(2j+1)
2

!(2j+1)!
!
[(1 − p)σφ]
(2j+1). From these expressions is
evident that [Pr(PA |A) − Pr(PB |A)] < 0 and [Pr(PB |B) − Pr(PA |B)] < 0, which implies
that uA − uφ < 0, and therefore σA =0 .S o σB ≤ σA =0 , a contradiction. Using Lemma 1,
we conclude that π = 1
2 implies σA = σB =0 ;a n dπ>1
2implies σA ≥ σB =0 ,a ss t a t e di nt h e
proposition. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2
Assume by contradiction that m>0 and σA ≥ σB. The expected utility of voting for A net of
the utility of voting for B can be expressed as in (2) and 3. In this case:
Λ1 =
n−3−m
2 X
j=0
⎛
⎝ (n − 1)!
³
n−(2j+1)−m
2
´
!
³
n−2−(2j+1)+m
2
´
!(2j +1 ) !
⎞
⎠[(1 − p)σφ]
(2j+1)
·[p +( 1− p)(1− σφ)]
·
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
π
h
(1−p)σB
p+(1−p)σA
im
2 h
p(1 − p)σB +( 1− p)
2 σAσB
in−(2j+1)−2
2
−(1 − π)
h
p+(1−p)σB
(1−p)σA
im
2 h
p(1 − p)σA +( 1− p)
2 σAσB
in−(2j+1)−2
2
⎫
⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎭
Consider now Λ0.W e c a n w r i t e :
Λ0 =
n−1−m
2 X
j=0
⎛
⎝ (n − 1)!
³
n−1−2j−m
2
´
!
³
n−1−2j+m
2
´
(2j)!
⎞
⎠[(1 − p)σφ]
2j
·
⎧
⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎩
π
h
(1−p)σB
p+(1−p)σA
im
2 h
p(1 − p)σB +( 1− p)
2 σAσB
in−2j−1
2
−(1 − π)
h
p+(1−p)σB
(1−p)σA
im
2 h
p(1 − p)σA +( 1− p)
2 σAσB
in−2j−1
2
⎫
⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎭
< 0
Consider ﬁrst the case in which π = 1
2, and assume by contradiction that σA >σ B.S i n c e
(1−p)σ(B)
p+(1−p)σ(A) <
p+(1−p)σ(B)
(1−p)σ(A) we have Λ0 < 0 and Λ1 < 0:s o< 0, which implies that σB ≥ σA,a
contradiction. Consider now the case in which π>1
2.T h e r e i s a p such that π
h
(1−p)σB
p+(1−p)σA
im
2 <
38(1 − π)
h
p+(1−p)σB
(1−p)σA
im
2 for any p>p. Assume by contradiction that σA >σ B and p ≥ p.I n t h i s
case too Λ0 < 0 and Λ1 < 0: so again uA−uφ < 0, which implies that σB ≥ σA, a contradiction.
¥
V I . 3 P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Assume that σA > 0,t h e ns i n c eσB ≥ σA,i tm u s tb et h a tuA − uB =0 . Proceeding as in
Proposition 1 we can obtain:
uA − uφ =
1
4
π[Pr(PA |A) − Pr(PB |A)] +
1
4
(1 − π)[Pr(PB |B) − Pr(PA |B)]
We can compute:
Pr(PB |B)=
n−3
2 X
j=0
Φ(j)
h
p(1 − p)σA +( 1− p)
2 σAσB
i
p +( 1− p)σB
n−(2j+1)−m
2
Pr(PB |A)=
n−3
2 X
j=0
Φ(j)
h
p(1 − p)σB +( 1− p)
2 σAσB
i
(1 − p)σB
n−(2j+1)−m
2
and
Pr(PA |A)=
n−3
2 X
j=0
Φ(j)
h
p(1 − p)σB +( 1− p)
2 σAσB
i
p +( 1− p)σA
n−(2j+1)−m
2
Pr(PA |B)=
n−3
2 X
j=0
Φ(j)
h
p(1 − p)σA +( 1− p)
2 σAσB
i
(1 − p)σA
n−(2j+1)−m
2
where: Φ(j)=
Ã
(n−1)! 
n−(2j+1)−m
2

!

n−2−(2j+1)+m
2

!(2j+1)!
!
((1 − p)(1− σ))
(2j+1). From these expres-
sions is evident that [Pr(PA |A) − Pr(PB |A)] < 0 and [Pr(PA |B) − Pr(PB |B)] < 0,w h i c h
implies that uA − uφ < 0: and therefore σA =0 , a contradiction.
We now prove that σB > 0. If this is not the case, the only other possibility is that
σB = σA =0 : we now show that this is impossible. We can write:
uB − uφ =
1
2
(1 − π)Pr(P0 |B) − π Pr(P0 |A)+
1
2
[(1 − π)Pr(PB |B) − πPr(PB |A)]
Since when σB = σA =0we have Pr(P0 |A)=P r( PB |A)=0 ,a n dPr(P0 |B) > 0, Pr(PB |B),
we have uB − uφ > 0, which implies σB > 0. ¥
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